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2 Relational theory and the discourses 
of power 
Kenneth J. Gergen 
If only the ruler and his people would refrain from harming each other, all 
the benefits of life would accumulate in the kingdom. Lao Tzu Tao Teh 
Ching. 
Although rich in evocative imagery and ripe with pragmatic potential, the 
concept of power has been a fruit not readily plucked by many social analysts. 
For example, organizational theorists, social psychologists, systems analysts, 
therapeutic specialists and educational theorists, all of whom might readily feast 
on its potential, have displayed an uncommon reticence to developing or 
applying the concept to ongoing social processes. In part this reluctance may be 
traced to the historical residues carried by the term. The concept of power is 
rhetorically hot; it is suffused with the revolutionary energies of countless 
diatribes against inequality, oppression, and domination. Thus, the social 
scientist who is reasonably at home with the exiting state of affairs may have 
little need for the term. To thrust it into the centre of analysis is to raise a red 
flag, suggesting that existing arrangements are replete with oppression and 
inequity, and that fundamental change is required. For the organizational theorist 
to characterize the business firm as a domain in which the powerful enslave the 
weak is to suggest revolutionary change. For a social psychologist to paint a 
picture of human relations as a continuous struggle for domination is to threaten 
the liberal ideology so central to the discipline's history. 
There are important exceptions to this general tendency. There are, for one, 
a substantial number of theorists within the Marxist and critical school tradition 
(Lukes, 1974; Habermas, 1971) whose analyses are specifically aimed at social 
critique and change. Further, there are theorists whose analyses of power either 
redefine it in such a way that it loses much of its evaluative edge ( e.g. Parsons, 
1969; Giddens, 1984), or who attempt to show how power distribution in 
western society is more equitable or more pluralist than generally believed (e.g. 
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Dahl, 1961). However, in spite of their potential, the language of power 
continues to remain in the penumbra of social analysis. 
In recent times even the classic theories of power have come under critical 
scrutinity (see for example, Clegg, 1989; Wartenberg, 1990). As social analysts 
have become increasingly aware of the textual or constructionist turn within the 
academy more generally, of the extent to which theoretical categories engender 
the putative objects of analysis, they have turned reflexively on their own 
conceptual implements. Under this kind of scrutiny, it has become increasingly 
difficult to take power seriously. Thus, Marxist critics may inveigh against the 
current distribution of power in contemporary culture, pointing out the 
hegemonic and oppressive character of the capitalist ideology. But, it is now 
asked, to what extent are such critiques to be trusted; are they accurate 
assessments of social life, as the analysts claim? For if the accounts of the 
critical analyst, no less than the bourgeois liberalist, are dominated by class 
interests, rhetorical tropes, and the negotiated agreements of a particular sub-
culture (in this case Marxist), then on what grounds are such accusations 
justified? Are they not mystifying in their effects? Or, in terms central to our 
present colloquy, is the concept of power not a social construction, used by 
theorists in this case as a rhetorical hammer for inducing social change? And if 
power is not a fact in the world, but an artifact of discourse, then in what sense 
should we take power relations in contemporary society as a topic about which 
serious discussion is demanded? 
Although I am quite compelled by this line of reflexive critique, I find myself 
simultaneously unsettled. There are two primary sources of my concern. The 
first is a general dismay over the future of social analysis. For, if this kind of 
deconstruction becomes the dominant intellectual posture, social analysis itself 
is slowly debilitated. If all that we have previously taken to be objects of study 
become, through such de-entification, nothing more than locutions in discursive 
space, then we are left, in the Derridian sense, with nothing of text. Social 
analysis ceases to inform us about the world, for the object of discourse is none 
other than discourse itself. If the object of theoretical discourse is thus 
deconstructed, the function of social analysis is simultaneously impugned. 
My second concern is more specific to the concept of power. Many within the 
constructionist fold are exploring possibilities for reconstituting the character of 
scientific inquiry. In particular, as the empiricist program begins to wane, and 
with it the belief in an ideologically neutral science, the door is open to 
legitimating social analyses of a distinctly valuational nature. That is, social 
constructionism invites the scientist to view professional actions in their full 
personal and political consequences. In this context, societal critique and 
reconstruction become central challenges for the human sciences. Thus, for 
example, feminist critics have condemned various institutional hierarchies for 
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their androcentric biases, and have attempted to coalesce around the attempt to 
alter the existing structure of power (see for example, Smith, 1987; Lipman-
Bluman, 1984). Similar critiques have been mounted by various ethnic 
minorities, children's rights advocates, and women against sexual and physical 
aggression. In each case the concept of differential power has been pivotal. Thus, 
to reduce the concept of power to that of mere construction is simultaneously to 
undermine the constructionist legitimation of social critique and reconstruction. 
How is this dilemma to be resolved? How, on the one hand, can we recognize 
the concept of power as cultural construction, and at the same time objectify the 
term within a program of societal critique? What place are we to give the 
concept of power: in future social analysis? It seems to me that there are two 
primary options to be considered here. First, we may agree that the concept of 
power is simply one among many symbolic implements for analyzing and 
criticizing existing states of affairs, and that it, like any other concept used for 
such purposes, is subject to various forms of deconstruction. Regardless of such 
de-entifying maneuvers, it may be said, the term will probably retain a good deal 
of its rhetorical or illocutionary capacity, and we can continue to use it for the 
foreseeable future. To put it otherwise, we can scarcely abandon concepts 
because they fail to be accurate descriptors; this would be to jettison virtually all 
propositional language. At the same time, one can scarcely speak without 
presuming some sort of world independent of language, to which the language 
is, by convention, referentially related. And, should sources of anguish be 
located within the space of existing conventions, then terms within the existing 
vernacular may be serviceable as pragmatic means of inducing change. There is 
nothing about constructionism that denies cultural participation. 
There is much to be said for this option, and for extending the range of 
rhetorical resources available for moral and political purposes. However, it is to 
a second possibility that I am drawn in the present paper. In important respects, 
social constructionist theory operates as a scientific metatheory. That is, like 
logical empiricism and critical rationalism, for example, it attempts to offer an 
account of the scientific process, a theory of scientific theories. At the same 
time, constructionism as a metatheory is neutral with respect to what form 
scientific theories should take. Unlike its competitors, it does not require that the 
theories of human action spawned within the sciences support or vindicate its 
suppositional network. 1 
In this sense, we can thus discriminate between two forms of theoretical ( and 
practical) work, that which opposes constructionist metatheory as contrasted 
with that which lends support. It is the second of these alternatives I wish to 
explore in what follows. This is first because there are many respects in which 
constructionism seems superior to existing alternatives. To hammer out 
conceptual tools by which the metatheory is vivified, is to augment its potentials. 
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In addition, as I shall hope to show, the major treatments of power currently 
extant are uncongenial to constructionist metatheory. Thus, to explore 
possibilities for a constructionist theory of power may enable new conceptions 
of power to emerge, and new conceptual resources to enter the cultural lists. 
Invited, then, is a formulation of power that is consistent with, or which lends 
rhetorical legitimacy to, a constructionist orientation to theory and social life. In 
the remainder of this paper, I shall thus open discussion on what may be termed 
a relational theory of power, and finally treat several implications of this 
particular option for issues in organizational and social life more generally. 
Discourses of power 
In loving your people and governing your state are you able to dispense 
with cleverness? Lao Tzu Tao Teh Ching 
One of the most intuitively compelling ways of conceptualizing power is in 
terms of the macro social order. One speaks easily of the power of such 
institutions as the church, government, military force, industry and so on. 
Marxist theory of class conflict and Parsonian functionalism represent formal 
articulations of the intuition. However, as debates on power have proceeded 
during the past 20 years, the macro-social orientation has met with significant 
difficulty. For one, it is difficult to comprehend social life without recourse to 
the individuals who make up the broad structures. Yet, once individuals are 
recognized, the theorist falls into a problematic dualism, with individuals on the 
one side and institutions on the other. Yet, the phenomenal sets are fully 
conflated; remove all the individuals and there is nothing left over to be called 
an institution, and vice versa. Such theories also favour a problematic 
determinism. We are forced, as it is said, by the power of institutions to behave 
as we do. Yet, if the theory is to be emancipatory, it must simultaneously plump 
for voluntary resistance against the institution. (Thus, the Marxist incitement, 
'workers of the world unite.') In the inducement to resist, the presumption of 
institutional determinism is undone. 
For these and other reasons many theorists have relocated the cite of power 
at the individual level. Even for theorists such as Lukes (1977) and Giddens 
(1984) who attempt to integrate concepts of both social structure and the 
individual into the same theory, the strong emphasis is placed on the latter as 
opposed to the former (see Barbalet, 1982; Layder, 1987). Most pervasive are 
definitions of power in terms of personal characteristics. Consider, for example 
the definitions of Dahl, 'A has power to the extent that he can get B to do 
something B would not otherwise do.' (1957, p.203); Lukes, 'power ... 
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presupposes human agency ... although agents operate within individually 
determined limits, they none the less have a relative autonomy and could have 
acted differently (1977, p.6-7); and Giddens 'to be an agent is to be able to 
deploy (chronically, in the flow of daily life) a range of causal powers, including 
that of influencing those deployed by others' (1984, p.14 ). To these definitions 
analysts typically add a range of additional processes, capacities, or 
characteristics at the psychological level. Thus theorists variously explain 
processes of domination in terms of individual wants, needs, choices, real 
interests, and the unconscious. 
While I see no compelling reason for returning to the macro social level of 
analysis, I am not wholly sanguine either with the further elaboration of the 
individual accounts, or with the integration of such accounts into a 
constructionist metatheory. There are, in my view, a number of serious problems 
inherent in the psycho-centered analysis of power, and at least three of these 
deserve attention in the present context. At the outset, post-empiricist and post-
structuralist critiques of recent years make it increasingly difficult to sustain the 
assumption of individual minds, capable of registering events in the world, 
contemplating these events on a rational basis, and acting on the basis of rational 
decisions. As it is argued, there are no viable accounts of either the means by 
which real world events could be converted to abstract ideas (in the head), nor 
the means by which abstract ideas ( or rational process) could be converted into 
concrete action (see my 1989 discussion). Further, should individuals possess 
independent minds, there would be no means by which others (including 
scientists) could determine their meaning or intent (see Fish, 1980), that is by 
which they could decipher the public code in such a way that intentions could 
be revealed. As Rorty (1979) concludes in his Philosophy and the Mirror of 
Nature, the presumption of individual minds, reflecting and reflecting on an 
independent nature, creates a host of unnecessary and principally insoluble 
riddles. There is good reason for abandoning the obfuscating dualisms of mind 
and nature, subject and object, inner and outer. 
Second, by placing mental characteristics in a pivotal explanatory position, 
theorists place themselves in a problematic position vis a vis the culture more 
generally. For as we find, the analyst's assertions about people's intentions, 
wants, needs, and unconscious are without compelling grounds for justification. 
Not only is it impossible for the analyst standing external to the individual, to 
fathom the true nature of the individual's mental states, but there are no 
respectable reasons for assuming that individuals can turn introspectively on 
themselves to accurately perceive their own mental condition (see Lyons, 1986; 
Gergen, 1994b). Given the shaky character of the analyst's assertions, then any 
statements about who does or does not possess power loses its substantive base. 
Assessments of current imbalances in power, oppressive conditions, and 
33 
injustices based on such mentalist attributions lose their warrant. The analyst 
claiming dispassionate grasp of the realities of social life thus appears either to 
be acting in bad faith or out of naive conventionalism. 
Finally, I am compelled by the arguments of Sampson (1978), Bellah et al. 
(1985), Schwartz (1986) and others concerning the inimical consequences of 
individualistic orientations for cultural life. The rhetoric of individualism, 
including the presumption of individual minds, rationality, intentionality, and the 
like, lends itself to forms of social life that, in my view, ultimately endanger the 
species (if not all life on the planet). For as this perspective suggests, each of us 
in essentially independent of the other, operating on the basis of our own powers 
of reason and volition, fundamentally opaque to others, and fundamentally bent 
on enhancing one's own being. Unless individuals are curbed from seeking their 
own private ends, life is a war of all against all. And, because individuals are 
fundamentally alone, relationships are products of artifice, unnatural and usually 
temporary. Such a view of social life !ends itself to alienation and divisiveness. 
Individualist theories of power additionally invite the public to see their social 
world in terms of domination and submission. We must, then, be attentive to the 
possibility of alternative formulations. 
Toward a relational theory of power 
As we find, there are important shortcomings inherent in both the macro-social 
and individual approaches to power. If we abandon the traditional accounts, 
what alternatives are available? Most important in the present context, how may 
we articulate a theory of power congruent with a constructionist metatheory? 
One moves with trepidation at this point. For, on the one hand, there is no 
univocal agreement concerning the nature of the constructionist standpoint. No 
one can properly claim to speak for the range of interlocutors more generally. 
Rather, we must envision a range of constructionist accounts with no single 
entry privileged in its position. In addition, the term power is widely used both 
within the social sciences and without. Its meanings and uses are many and 
varied. As one moves toward a reformulation, many of the previous meanings 
are discredited, altered or destroyed. In this sense, any new minting of the term 
threatens a range of social patternings sustained and supported by the previous 
meanings. As outlined, I do believe the previous conceptualizations of the term 
have inimical consequences for society. At the same time, there are many 
contexts in which I would heartily endorse the critical manner in which the term 
is used; I would favour the kinds of patterns sustained or advocated by the term 
in its traditional form. Thus, while I believe a constructionist refiguration of the 
concept could open new and potentially significant modes of action, I do not 
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thereby wish to favour yet another totalizing discourse. 
With these caveats at hand, there is at least one critical site at which the 
articulation of a constructionist theory of power can commence. It is the site of 
the privileged ontology. Unlike individual theories of power (in which the 
individual mind serves as the originary source), and in contrast to macro social 
theories (in which large-scale collective structures are presumed), most 
constructionist accounts begin with the presumption of human relatedness. Both 
the focus of concern and the explanatory fulcrum within a constructionist frame 
are episodes, processes or patterns achieved by ongoing processes of human 
interchange (Gergen, 1994a). It is the conversation which is perhaps most 
emblematic of the constructionist orientation, for the conversation is the product 
of neither an individual nor an institution, but of face-to-face, mutually 
contingent relationships. Further, it is from this nexus of joint-action (Shotter, 
1980) that language ensues, and from language the vast array of ontological 
assumptions, including such assertions as individuals exist, and institutions 
control our lives. 
Beginning with relatedness as the central ingredient, I am also drawn by 
certain aspects of Foucault's (1979; 1980) discussions of power. Foucault also 
shares a discontent with the traditional macro social view. As he argues, this 
essentially feudal form of power (juridico-discursive in his terms) has largely 
been replaced by what he terms disciplinary power. In the juridico-discursive 
case, specific rule systems, backed by the equivalent of a police force, demanded 
obedience. However, in the disciplinary context of the Panopticon, techniques 
were developed which led to the incorporation of belief systems within subject 
populations. Suppression was replaced by internalization. Central for present 
purposes, among the most important sources of disciplinary power are discursive 
or disciplinary regimes, roughly organized bodies of discourse and associated 
practices that serve both to engender beliefs and to rationalize their own 
existence. As the system of discourse, often taken to be truth or knowledge by 
its advocates, becomes the argot of everyday activity, seeping into the capillaries 
of the normal or taken for granted, so does the aggregate become complicit in 
its own subjugation. 
While Foucault generally avoids the question of defining power, his analysis 
is congenial in certain respects with the constructionist emphasis on relatedness. 
Because of the centrality of discourse to his analysis, and the inherent relational 
quality of language, Foucault's analysis is primarily concerned with relational 
processes. The chief focus is the emergence and extension of power within 
micro-social processes ( e.g. the confessional, the doctor-patient relationship) Or, 
as Foucault (1980) writes, 'power means a more-or-less organized ... coordinated 
cluster of relations' (p.198). Additionally promising is Foucault's emphasis on 
the capillary diffusion of power. Rather than seeing power as inherent in vast 
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centralized structures, or within the capacities of charismatic individuals, power 
relations are distributed throughout the society. Further, for Foucault, relations 
of power are not travesties on the normal or the valued. Rather, in certain 
respects they are essential to social life, and productive of its most valued 
institutions. 
Yet, while drawn by certain aspects of Foucault's writings, it is difficult to 
locate anything resembling a fully developed perspective in this work. 
Ambiguities regarding the character of power and oppression are pervasive. 
Further elaboration is thus invited. In carrying out such an elaboration, I am 
guided by certain aspects of Bakhtin's ( 1981) discussions of language and social 
process. Of particular interest, Bakhtin argues persuasively for the fragmented 
character of cultural languages. That is, our common languages are seldom 
unified, guided by an integral and inclusive set of rules. Rather, we inherit a 
multitude of linguistic usages, a legacy of long and complex relations among 
various cultural and sub-cultural groups. And, as we move through the novel 
demands of multitudinous contexts, so are we forced to borrow, patch, elide, and 
so on. Language is in a continuous state of multiple transformations (or 
heteroglossia in Bakhtin's terms). When paired with Foucault's emphasis on 
discourse, we might conclude that no society is bound to a singular discursive 
regime. Rather, we must entertain the possibility of multiple, fragmentary and 
partial regimes, of power relations as heterogeneous and ever changing.3 We 
shall return to these themes shortly. 
In the present analysis there is no attempt to define power in terms of a set of 
behavioral, psychological, or material coordinates. Rather, the focus will be on 
discourses of power, their emergence in relationships, and their consequences 
as they come to possess a lived validity. As I shall propose, within particular 
contexts of relatedness, discourses of power come to have functional 
significance. Two analytic moments may be distinguished, the first in which 
persons in relationship may come to view themselves as possessing the power 
to act in various ways. In a second set of relational conditions, a discourse of 
power over is invited.4 The primary ingredients of this view are contained in four 
inter-related theses: 
The formation of relational nuclei 
For present purposes I will assume that human beings exist within an array of 
relationships (both to other human beings first, and further to the environment 
more generally). They do not commence life as single, unitary or self-contained 
monads but gain their very capacity to exist in such apparent states (what we call 
states of individual identity) by virtue of their relatedness. In this sense we are 
always already in relationship (social and otherwise). However, to gain 
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conceptual clarity regarding the genesis of power in a constJuctionist frame, it 
is useful to explicate more fully the emergence of interdependence within a 
dyad, what we may call an elementary relational nucleus. Although face to face 
relationships will ordinarily entail the mutual coordination of bodily movements, 
sounds, focus of gaze, facial configurations, and so on, let us focus on what will 
prove a critical element in our analysis, the linguistic construction of meaning. 
Language essentially derives its meaning (or capacity to communicate) by 
virtue of the coordinated activities of two or more persons. In this sense, the 
utterances (or other actions) of a single individual are not in themselves 
meaningful. For example, the utterance of a selected morpheme (e.g. ed, to, at) 
does not itself possess meaning. Standing alone, the morpheme fails to be 
anything but itself; in the Derridian sense the morpheme operates as a free 
standing signifier, opaque and indeterminate. Lone utterances begin to acquire 
communicative potential when another (or others) coordinate themselves to the 
utterance, that is, when they add some form of supplementary action (which may 
or may not be linguistic). The supplement may be as simple as an affirmation 
(e.g. yes, right) that indeed the utterance succeeds in communicating. It may take 
the form of an action, e.g. shifting the line of gaze upon hearing the word 'look'. 
Or it may extend the utterance in some way, e.g. when, 'the' is uttered by one 
interlocutor is followed by ,'end', uttered by a second. Thus the basic unit of 
linguistic meaning may be viewed as action-and-supplement. The formation of 
meaning within the primitive nucleus thus depends on the mutual privileging of 
language (and other actions). If others do not recognizably treat one's utterances 
as meaningful, if they fail to coordinate themselves around such offerings, one 
is reduced to nonsense. 
In this regard, virtually any form of utterance may be granted the privilege of 
being meaningful, or conversely, serves as a candidate for absurdity. The other 
may invest profound significance in the simplest groan or monosyllabic grunt, 
or may respond with an opaque stare to the most perfectly formed sentence. The 
fate of the speaker's utterance is in the other's hands. As we find, the initial 
language unit does not, in pristine form, demand any particular form of 
coordinated action. In principle, an utterance may be taken to mean anything (see 
Gergen, 1994a). The act of supplementation thus operates in two opposing ways. 
First, it grants a specific potential to the meaning of the utterance. It treats it as 
meaning this and not that, as entailing one form of action as opposed to another, 
as having a particular illocutionary force as opposed to some other. At the same 
time, as it grants specific meaning, it simultaneously acts to constrain alternative 
possibilities of the utterance. Because it does mean this, it cannot mean that. In 
this sense, while others' actions invite us into meaning, they also act so as to 
negate our potential. From the enormous array of possibilities, only a limited 
array are made possible. And, as others both open and constrain, so do our 
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subsequent actions serve the same functions with respect to them. 
The creation of a local ontology and value system 
Of course spoken language is only one form of coordinated action, and it may 
be that the linguistic account just outlined could provide a useful metaphor for 
the development of an forms of relatedness. In effect, all may require action-
supplement sequences that define and constrain. Yet, for analytic purposes it is 
useful in the present context to distinguish between two outcomes intrinsic to 
most attempts to coordinate actions through language. In the first instance, to the 
degree that given patterns of coordination are to be sustained within a nucleus, 
language usage must be reiterative. Sequences of words-and-supplements must 
be replicated (or nearly so) under particular conditions. Thus, for example, 
employees in an office setting may coordinate their actions around such terms 
as boss, the mail, balance sheets, and the like. In order to carry out the tasks that 
we generally call getting the job done they will employ such terms on a 
repetitive basis. In doing so, however, the group succeeds in developing a local 
ontology. The terms in conventional usage come to establish a localized reality. 
The vocabularies essential to coordination of the participants take on the sense 
of a palpable order: what the world is made of in this case. Terms such as boss, 
the mail, and the like cease to be merely the syllables uttered under certain 
conditions, but come to serve as literal descriptions of what occurs. They 
become sedimented or entified. 
The second byproduct of linguistic coordination is a valuational (moral, 
ethical) reality. To the extent that an utterance is indeterminant, open to multiple 
meanings, coherent patterning is disrupted. That is, established patterns of 
coordinated action (repetitive action-and-supplements) are threatened. If 
coordinated action within a group is to be sustained, it is thus essential to seal 
off the potential of the signifiers. Means must be found of delimiting the range 
of possible supplementarities. (For example, if he is not the boss but our slave 
or a vicious exploiter, then the typical patterns of action are difficult to sustain.) 
Means are invited, then, of restricting the process of signification ( or preventing, 
what in other terms is called unlimited semiosis). At least one common means 
of doing so is by developing an ancillary language of valuation, a language that 
both places a positive value on existing patterns of action and impugnes all 
deviations. 5 
Such valuational supports may take many forms. In many instances groups 
have claimed certain patterns (e.g. democracy, charity, heterosexuality) to have 
inherent value. Or, strong appeals are made to the valuational authorities, to 
God, the Bible, wise men, poets, and so on. In many quarters reliance is placed 
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on good reasons, as embodied in folk tales and axioms, or in volumes on 
methodology or philosophical foundations. Typically, each of these languages 
is also fortified by practices of approbation, means of discrediting the deviant 
and rewarding those remaining within the ontology and its implicature. In each 
case, however, the existing ontology and its underlying array of coordinated 
actions is buttressed by a valuational discourse that discredits deviation and 
sanctifies tradition. 6 
The condition of centripetal power 
By not exalting the talented you will cause the people to cease from rivalry 
and contention. By not displaying what is desirable, you will cause the 
people's hearts to remain undisturbed. Tzu Tao Teh Ching 
Tendencies toward coordinated action also establish the conditions for what may 
be termed centripetal power. Consider here a condition (idealized for analytic 
purposes) in which varying groups succeed in stabilizing valued patterns of 
coordinated activity. The local ontologies are embraced and the valuational 
discourse functions so as to sustain the common reality. In effect, by the internal 
standards of the group, they function in an effective way. Centripetal power is 
achieved within a group when they can achieve their own goals according to 
their own definitional terms. They are empowered from within their own 
conceptual configuration. Illustrative, for example, is a couple who believe they 
have control of their lives, and can live in a reasonably stable and fulfilling way. 
Or, centripetal power is exemplified by an organization that sees itself as 
achieving its goals, expanding, profiting, and innovating in just the ways it 
defines as valuable. In effect, we are not speaking in this instance of a power 
over, but the sense of power to achieve specific goals.7 It is also important to 
reiterate that the concept of power is not objectified on this account. That is, I 
am not speaking here of the actual capacity of a relational unit to achieve its 
ends. Rather, the concept of power operates in this case as a discursive vehicle 
for those within the relationship, a means of indexing a particular configuration 
of coordinated action. It is manifest in attempts, for example to label such 
coordination as achievement, or to see the interaction as possessing a goal which 
is being fulfilled. 
The concept of centripetal power enables us to open several lines of 
discussions occluded by classic treatments of the subject. First, on the present 
account, we may see the culture as one in which local coordinations are 
everywhere under development. Thus, rather than a singular hierarchy, as 
suggested by much classic work on power, we find a multiplicity of groups, each 
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of which may define power and its attainment according to different ontologies 
and value systems. In principle, with each movement toward coordinated action 
within a dyad or group, there are corresponding possibilities for centripetal 
power. To the extent that persons participate in multiple groups, with different 
conceptions of the real and the good, configurations of power are multiple. To 
the extent that the terms of the real and the good are negotiable, such 
configurations undergo continuous transformation. 
The present perspective also acts as an antidote to common tendencies to 
define power in terms of a singular dimension, commodity, or criterion. The 
analyst standing outside the culture is not free, on this account, to render a 
general characterization of the source of power (e.g. capital, military might, 
freedom of action). Rather, in the present case we find that attributions of power, 
powerlessness, and oppression must always take account the local character of 
power ascription. Each group may come to see itself as coordinated around 
certain ends or goals, and these ends or goals may be as varied as there are 
. differences in vocabulary. At the same time, any group may come to see other 
groups, those who fail to share their forms of coordinated action, as inferior, 
lacking judgement, lacking motivation, and powerless. This is to say that 
attributing power to those in executive positions, with high income levels, 
occupying political office, reaching championships and the like, is to join the 
interpretive systems of the particular groups in question. It is to capitulate to the 
apparent objectivity and valuational systems of the local realities, raising these 
constructions to the level of fundamental ontology. The valued coordinations of 
any given group may either be devalued or considered irrelevant within the local 
ontology of other groups. For the Buddhist monk, those bent on economic gain 
are pitied; they are running dogs. For those valuing the simple life, close to 
community and nature, high office is tedious and pressurized; and for 
communities devoted to intellectual or aesthetic ends, team championships exact 
a form of slavery. The present conception of centripetal power, then, acts to 
inhibit broadscale or unilateral critiques of existing power imbalances. Such 
critiques always presume some standpoint; their problem is in generalizing their 
ontology across all sectors of society. 
Further, the present analysis also militates against knee-jerk condemnations 
of exclusionary practices, often viewed as expressions of power. As people 
consolidate communities, school systems, private clubs, and the like in such a 
way that entry is difficult or forbidden by others, we are quick to criticize. Such 
actions seem to be raw and unfair exercises of the powerful to exclude all others, 
to sustain their own positions of superiority while denying others the right to 
participate. Yet, as the present analysis suggests, groups whose actions are 
coordinated around given constructions of reality risk their traditions by 
exposing them to the ravages of the outliers. That is, from their perspective, 
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efforts must be made to protect the boundaries of understanding, to prevent the 
signifiers from escaping into the free-standing environment where meaning is 
decried or dissipated. In this sense, unfair or exclusionary practices are not 
frequently so from the standpoint of the actors. Rather, they may seem altogether 
fair, just and essential to sustain valued ideals against the infidels at the gates. 
This is also to say that we may anticipate, on these terms, perpetual struggles 
against oppression. For centripetal forces within groups will always operate 
toward stabilization, the establishment of valued meaning, and thus the 
exclusion of alterior realities. Exclusive communities, private schools and secret 
societies are simply the most flagrant manifestations of a process that operates 
at all levels of social life. From international negotiations, to the whispered 
gossip of daily relationships, processes of coordination and exclusion are in 
operation. Let us consider a second site of power ascription. 
Counter-reality and the emergence of centrifugal power 
When all the world recognizes good as good, this in itself is evil. Indeed, 
the hidden and the manifest give birth to each other. Lao Tzu Tao Teh 
Ching 
As the present analysis suggests, all those practices taken to be unfairly 
exclusionary or oppressive are only so by virtue of a particular ontology. 
Outsiders to a group would fail to experience exclusion, except for the fact that 
they have come to accept the ontology and related values of a particular group. 
If members of a bridge club hold a closed tournament, there is no outcry of 
discrimination by the local bowling league. Outcries of injustice and 
discrimination are the result of generalizing the ontology and related value 
system of a particular group beyond its borders, and possessing a rationale by 
virtue of which this condition is held to be wrong (i.e. unjust, inhumane). 
Of course, daily life is seldom so tranquil as at the borders of France and 
Switzerland or between those who prefer bridge as opposed to bowling, both 
instances of centripetal power processes at work in relatively independent 
groups. Rather, we confront widespread fears of power imbalances, accusations 
of inequity, and attributions of exploitation. Unions are created to curb the self-
serving tendencies of management; feminists work to right the balance of power 
in the workplace; and the 'have not' nations express resentment and contempt for 
the hegemonic tendencies of the 'haves'. To understand such actions our analysis 
must press beyond the condition of centripetal power. More specifically, the 
prevalence of intergroup conflict requires an understanding of the transformation 
from conditions of centripetal power to those of centrifugal power. Rather than 
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viewing a group as possessing power to (as in the case of centripetal power), we 
must explore the conditions in which the sense of power over becomes 
dominant. 
The critical transformation in this case has its origins in the production of 
counter-reality. As we have seen, participants in a continuing relationship will 
tend toward a stabilized ontology. Physicists will agree, for example, that the 
world is fundamentally material, and idealist philosophers that it is 
fundamentally mental. Yet, in moving centripetally toward a stabilized reality, 
the interlocutors simultaneously set in motion an opposing tendency. For in 
generating agreeable assertions concerning what is the case, in effect a positive 
ontology, the soil is also prepared for the growth of a an oppositional discourse, 
a negative ontology This is so because the intelligibility of any assertion is only 
made possible through contrasts, differences, or negations. That something is the 
case can only stand as an informative assertion against the backdrop of an 
alternative or a contrary. To specify that Joan is the boss stands as meaningful 
only if the world contains non-bosses; to declare profit to be a 'good' is only 
significant if there are other outcomes that are not good. 
To press further, in the creation of the positive ontology possibilities for its 
own subversion are generated. As participants in a relationship come to organize 
themselves around discourses of the real and the good, they set the conditions 
for disorganization. This is so because the terms of the discourse have no fixed 
context of application; they may be applied over a broad arena. And as 'language 
goes on holiday' (in Wittgenstein's terms, 1953), any object of one naming 
becomes a candidate for another. Any proclamation stands subject to question. 
If there are the rich, then there must be the poor; and if there are the poor by 
what rights are certain persons granted status as the former and not others? On 
what grounds are the designations made? Could the reverse be possible? And if 
there are justifications for the present arrangement, let us say in terms of rights, 
then the possibility is simultaneously created for a concept of wrongs. And 
questioning is again invited: Why are certain conditions granted the status of 
right or proper, and others designated as wrong or unjust? Is it possible that what 
now stands as just could be its opposite? Without the creation of the positive 
ontology, there would be little means of challenge; to question or criticize one 
must possess an intelligible discourse of counterclaims. Without version there 
is no role for subversion. 
We thus find that participants in a relationship exist in a state of continuous 
threat. In creating a given ontology and its rationalization, they also generate 
grounds for doubt. Their very proclamations of what is the case simultaneously 
assert the possibility of their negation. In this sense, the process of assertion 
feeds upon itself. For to begin the process is also to create tendencies toward 
opposition. In turn, the threat of opposition invites a further strengthening of the 
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network of assertions. Thus, for example, to create an arsenal for purposes of 
superior might is simultaneously to create the possibility that one is not superior. 
The possibility instigates further arms development, which again raises the 
question of sufficiency. The quest for power incessantly feeds upon its own 
doubts. 
More central to our purposes, as the negative ontology is articulated, and 
critique becomes possible, the conditions are established for centrifugal power, 
an emerging sense of inside vs. outside, we vs. them, and most focally, the 
power of one over the other. 8 This is to say that the ascription of power over, is 
importantly dependent on a language of critique. If a manager gives a raise to an 
employer, or a policeman apprehends a criminal, we are not likely to speak in 
terms of power. So long as these are creditable aims, we are not likely to see one 
as manifesting power over the other. However, if the manager gives a raise far 
beneath what the employee deserves, or the apprehended individual has 
committed no crime, then ascriptions of power are apposite. The critique 
separates subject from object, us from them; and because they do not succumb 
to critique (their patterns remain obdurate) it is possible to see them in terms of 
having power over. It is the result of the negative ontology that the concept of 
power acquires the moral force with which it is often embued. 
Let us consider the emergence of such attributions in diachronic dimension. 
It is not simply the potential for critique that evokes claims of power 
discrepancies. The stage must be properly set; a particular array of relational 
scenarios is implicated. Consider first the development of 'power over' within 
a given nucleus. As relational nuclei expand and develop over time there is a 
tendency toward differentiation, with different individuals carrying out different 
tasks with different results. In effect, no organization or society is constituted by 
homogeneous living conditions. With variation in such conditions, and the 
availability of a negative ontology, the stage is set for questioning and critique. 
Why are outcomes distributed in just this way; why are they privileged and we 
are not; why am I positioned in this inferior way? The mounting of questions and 
critique, in tum, commonly evoke a posture of defense and counter-critique on 
the part of others. And, as I have outlined elsewhere (Gergen, 1992), the 
rhetorical process of argumentation, at least within the Western tradition, is 
typically accompanied by progressive tendencies toward isolation (with each 
group turning increasingly inward toward those with whom coordination of 
language and action is most easily accomplished), and antagonism (with each 
group locating forms of evil within the other, and acting on these assumptions). 
Those under attack thus become invested in defending and reinforcing the 
traditions, while those engaged in critique seek means of change. As such efforts 
are thwarted in various ways, so do attributions of power become relevant. 
These attributions may be intensified by the existence of other, adjoining 
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groups. In the earlier account we spoke first of a hypothetical condition in which 
each nucleus developed its own reality, independent of all others. However, as 
the thesis unfolded we found social life more properly viewed as a plurality of 
nuclei, ever shifting, ever interpenetrating. In this sense, instances of an 
independent nucleus should be rare. Rather than a single ontology and its 
negations, there are multiple ontologies and valuational discourses (and their 
antitheses) available to most relationships. Such cases occur most frequently as 
members of one group become functional in other groups, the family member 
is also a student, the executive a marriage partner, the worker a union member, 
and so on. The greater the complexity of society, the more porous the boundaries 
of a group's reality.9 
Most important for present purposes, these alternative realities become 
available to those in contention. Thus, any group embarking on critique is likely 
to find available a host of supplementary rationales for bolstering its case; 
likewise, those on the defensive can make use of many ambient rationalities. The 
sense of boundaries between, and power over intensifies. Further, and most 
interestingly, as the various bodies of signification begin to interpenetrate, the 
stage is set for what may be termed contrapuntal conflicts. In this condition, 
members of differing groups come to share conceptions of valued ends, but carry 
out critique in terms of local vernaculars, each but dimly understood outside the 
confines of the group. Groups view themselves as contending for particular 
resources, but the grounds for the claims are carved from different 
intelligibilities. The government of Iraq shares in the common value placed on 
economic resources, but the rationale for the invasion of Kuwait fails to be 
rhetorically compelling outside the Arab community; similarly the US 
government's claims to the injustice of the invasion fail to be understood within 
Iraq. As the rhetorics are converted to acts of brutality, the relationship is 
indexed in terms of power differences. 
As a general surmise, it may be said that both centripetal and centrifugal 
forces are always at work within the culture. As relationships form, friendships, 
colleagueships, partnerships, and so on, actions will be coordinated, outcomes 
will be invested with significance, and efforts will be made to stabilize and 
exclude. Simultaneously, doubts are created in the existing coordinations, and 
the complex configurations of normal society will work toward their 
questioning. To the extent that memberships within these complex 
configurations equip people both to value and to doubt, the stage is set for 
ascriptions of power differences, exploitation, and injustice. 
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Consequences of the configuration 
These remarks outline an orientation to power consistent with certain aspects of 
a constructionist metatheory, namely its assumption of fundamental relatedness 
and its focus on the discursive structuring of the social world. As I have tried to 
argue, we may envision two major moments in the emerging construction of 
power. The first derives from the capacity of groups for self-organization, and 
the concomitant moulding of local realities. With local conceptions of fact and 
value in place, groups may come to see themselves as possessing power in 
various degrees. This concern with local conceptions of power enabled us to 
view power as a comparative concept, differentially established, variably 
distributed and continuously changing. The second moment in the construction 
of power derives from the generation of a negative ontology, the necessary 
counterpart to the group's construction of reality. With this conception at hand 
we were prepared to treat the moral dimension of power differences, the 
prevailing sense that power is corrupt and oppressive. 
Although it is possible to assess the proposal in a variety of ways, I wish in 
closing to confront one important critique and then to explore several 
implications of the analysis. The critique is that of the realist who may find little 
of value in the present account. Does the present analysis not deny the evidence 
of power in the capacity of large armies to rampage across helpless lands, the 
capacity of wealthy nations to control the outcomes of the poor, or the 
ruthlessness of dictators in silencing the people through threat and torture? 
These are the realities of the world, the realist proclaims, and the fact of power 
is undeniable. Of course, this is a rhetorically compelling critique, and in certain 
walks of daily life I might well speak of power in realist terms. But the critical 
point is the situated character of such speech acts. For under other 
circumstances, I might also intelligibly speak of the power of a beautiful face, 
the power of an infant's cry, or the power of a magnet. The meanings here are 
clearly different from the initial examples, but how should we distinguish 
between the more and less accurate meanings? And if we are free to negotiate 
about such matters, then by what particular authority does the concept of power 
necessarily apply to armies, wealth and tyrants? Are there not other and different 
means of describing these same conditions, ways for example that might be used 
by the actors themselves? And if taking a scholarly stance, would it not be 
possible to demonstrate the metaphoric character of the concept of power, its 
problematic assumption of linear and efficient causality, and the incapacity of 
analysts to locate specific referents? As Lukes (1974) proposes, the concept of 
power is essentially contested, and it is that essential ambiguity which the 
present proposal attempts to embody. Let us turn, then, to two realms of 
implication. 
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Power and the management of organizations 
There are a number of important implications of the present analysis for issues 
of organizational management. Chief among them is the challenge posed for the 
hierarchical model of power. The traditional view of organizational structure, 
with a CEO as senior in command, followed by various levels of managers, 
workers, and the like proves problematic on a variety of grounds outlined above. 
Further, as suggested within the present analysis, what are termed achievements 
within organizations are first and foremost the result of coordinated activities. 
There most certainly are individuals we single out as high and low level 
managers and the like. However, such labels should not obscure the extent to 
which their actions are embedded in patterns of reciprocity. Those who lead only 
do so by virtue of a shared system of understanding in which others agree to do 
what is called following. The labels could be switched with no ontological 
consequences; leaders might be viewed as victims of their underlings, and 
followers as the true power behind the office. Further, the extent to which all 
such patterns are sustained depends on the extent to which participants keep the 
borders of meaning secure. 
As the present account also suggests, the attempt of organizations to achieve 
effective outcomes takes place in highly tenuous circumstances. As languages 
of efficacy are developed, so do they engender a local sense of reality that is at 
once self sustaining and self-justifying. Thus, the world looks different within 
an organization than it does to those outside, and those within one sector of the 
system come to see reality as different from those within another. And the sense 
of what is the case in any of these sectors comes to seem correct and superior. 
Further, because the viability of a business organization depends on the realities 
outside itself, and the functioning of each organizational sector is vitally affected 
by functioning in another, then the strong tendency toward local ontology works 
against the longterm vitality of the organization. As each organization or sector 
within the firm forms its realities, necessary for effective action, so do they 
unleash the forces for their own undoing. 
This latter outcome is hastened in some degree by the creation of the negative 
ontology. As the firm establishes a definition of the good and the powerful, so 
do they lay the groundwork for challenging their local ontology. Yet, in the end, 
the health of the organization may depend on a sensitive listening to the counter-
reality. For as the alternative realities are given credence within the firm, so is 
the firm more fully coordinated to the surrounding environment. As the firm 
listens to the angry voices of those who accuse of them of exploitation, 
environmental pollution, unfair employment practices, immoral or insensitive 
practices of takeover, and the like, they stand to gain. If they do not use such 
instances to bolster the validity of their internal realities, and incorporate these 
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languages into their own, then they may increase their capacity to co-exist in a 
larger world of coordinated interdependence. Success may require the undoing 
of effective patterns of action within the organization, but from the present 
standpoint, the only viable organization is one in which there is a continuous 
process of organizing and disorganizing. 
Power, values, and constructing society 
Within a constructionist perspective, one of the most important questions to be 
put to a theory concerns its ramifications for lived vocabularies. That is, rather 
than asking whether a theory accurately reflects life as it is, (an obfuscating 
question in itself), the constructionist asks, what are the social implications of 
a given system of theoretical intelligibility should that system be incorporated 
into ongoing social life? In this respect, the present analysis has several 
implications I take to be of promising proportion. 
First there is an important sense in which the present analysis can soften 
existing tendencies toward ascendent or competitive striving. As we have seen, 
conceptions of power arise within particular groups, and are embedded within 
various forms of social practice. Mutually annihilating competitions come about 
largely through the broad dissemination of a single reality system. It is the 
unquestioned assumption that wealth, victory, high office and so on are valuable 
and important that moves people to competitive action. As the present analysis 
suggests, such assumptions of the effective and the good should always be 
placed in question. The grounds for question are always there, born of the 
negative ontology. Thus, rather than joining the bandwagons of the culture ( e.g. 
striving for increased income, placing children in competitive sports programs, 
purchasing the latest electronics, etc), the present analysis suggest a scanning of 
alternative realities. For as the oppositions become apparent, the glitter can be 
removed from the prevailing goals. 
In a similar vein the present account also dulls the edge of absolutist critiques 
of unfairness and injustice. Traditionally, critiques of this kind recognize only 
a single reality. There are the oppressors and the oppressed, the exploiters and 
the exploited, and so on. The former are deemed evil, the latter good, and where 
evil was, good shall now prevail. In effect, in their one-world myopia, such 
critiques are highly devisive, exacerbating conflict and galvanizing resistance. 
From the present standpoint, such accusations are considerably softened. One is 
instead invited to expand the range of relevant perspectives, to explore the 
realities of the dominating groups, as well as those of still other groups whose 
realities may differ. This is not to negate the moral force of existing accusations 
of inequity and exploitation. Such accusations are fully legitimate within the 
ontology of the exploited group. But rather than unleashing unilateral attacks in 
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the name of righteousness, the present urging 1s for a co-mingling of 
perspectives. 
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Notes 
1. As I have outlined elsewhere (Gergen, 1994a) most behaviourist theory in 
psychology represents a recapitulation at the theoretical level of the 
suppositions built into the empiricist metatheory guiding the research. 
2. As Cousins and Hussain (1984) summarize, 'there is in Foucault's writings no 
theory of power, not even a sketch of such a theory' (p.225). However, as they 
see his more positive contribution, Foucault offers an invaluable tool-kit for 
the anlaysis of power relations. 
3. Influenced by Derrida's analyses of the undecidability (continuous deferral) 
of meaning, much the same conclusion is reached by Laclau & Mouffe 
(1985).Arguing against the Marxist view of power as essentialist, they are 
concerned with the ways in which meanings are distributed across 
relationships and altered in usage. 
4. In distinguishing between the power to take action vs. the power over other, 
the present theory reflects what many theorists (see, for example, Pitkin, 
1972) take to be a central distinction in the description of power. However, 
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where most view the distinction as primarily referential, the present analysis 
is concerned with its performative potential. 
5. It is within the development of these local ontologies of the true and the good, 
that individual actors also become identified as such and furnished 
(discursively) with various attributes (e.g. emotions, intention). For Foucault, 
this process would be seen as one of subjectification. Yet, while the process 
of subjectification (let us say, by a given regime of knowledge) would be 
viewed by Foucault as a power relation, in the present analysis power is an 
ascriptive implement growing out of relational forms. There are, on the 
present account, discursive relationships, and the resulting discourse may 
include accounts of power (attributed to groups, individuals, material, etc.). 
6. It is the attempt to fix meaning within the group that constitutes the moment 
of power for Laclau and Mouffe (1985).Thus, 'in a given social formation 
there can be a variety of hegemonic nodal points . . . some of them may be 
highly overdetermined: they may constitute points of condensation of a 
number of social relations and, thus become the focal point of a multiplicity 
of totalizing effects' (p.139). In contrast, in the present analysis it is not the 
self-organizing process that itself constitutes power. Rather, such self-
organization sets the context for a particular discourse of power. 
7. It is in this respect that the present account is in accord with Arendt's (1969) 
view of power as a consensual (rather than imposed) outcome. As Arendt 
argues, power refers to the ability of a group to realize its own ends through 
cooperation. In the present case, the concern is not with actual capacities, but 
the group's construction of what they take to be such capacities. 
8. I have borrowed the concepts of centripetal and centrifugal forces from 
Bakhtin 's ( 1981) discussion of forces in the organization and disorganization 
of cultural languages. However, where Bakhtin views such disorganization as 
naturally derived from the varied demands made on language (thus forcing 
multiple uses), the present analysis focuses on the inherent potential for 
conflict within any ontological aggregate. 
9. See also Bakhtin's (1981) discussion of dialogized heteroglossia, a term 
referring to the subtle and self-consciousness undermining of a language 
system (its beliefs and suppositions) as it interacts with other languages. 
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